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TESTS FOR DETERMINING PATENT VALIDITY-A
NEW APPROACH BY THE NINTH CIRCUIT?
Perhaps no specialized area of the law has been the subject of
controversy longer than the requirements which have been imposed by
the courts for upholding the validity of patents issued by the Patent Office. The controversy has largely centered on what criteria should be
utilized by the courts in determining whether there is a patentable invention; however, there is one general point of agreement among the
authorities-there has never been a clear-cut line of demarcation between what is and what is not a patentable invention.' On the one
hand, there are the advocates who urge the courts to apply a liberal definition of "patentable invention" and to thus uphold the validity of
patents issued by the Patent Office. On the other hand, there are
advocates who urge the courts to apply a strict definition of "patentable invention," which indicates dissatisfaction with the criteria employed
by the Patent Office in issuing patents. 2 While the rhetoric of the distinguished spokesmen for both sides has changed somewhat since the
original Patent Act in 1790, the primary issue remains the same-a
basic policy conflict as to whether society is benefited more by the issuance of patents as a means of encouraging the promotion of technology, or whether the monopolistic character of the patent outweighs
the benefits to society and thus requires that patents be granted in only
exigent circumstances.
A review of relatively recent cases indicates that both the Supreme Court and the lower courts have adopted a restrictive view
towards the granting of patents, 3 and patent validity has thus been upheld only rarely. The Patent Office has historically adopted a more
liberal view as to patentability and has issued patents whenever the invention was found to be new and useful.
The Supreme Court has enunciated several subjective tests to be
utilized in determining the patentability of inventions; however, the
use of these tests by the courts has yielded a common result-most
patents have been found invalid. Recent decisions in the Ninth Circuit
highlight the fact that the courts have generally adopted a stringent
1.
Threat to
2.
3.

See generally Posnack, The Judicial Erosion of Our Patent System:
Inventive Initiative, 37 A.B.A.J. 357, 360 (1951).
See text accompanying notes 44 & 48 infra.
See text accompanying notes 47 & 96 infra.
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policy regarding patent validity. The incidence of cases in which the
Ninth Circuit has ruled that the patent issued by the Patent Office was
invalid has risen from 58 percent in 1963 to 90 percent for the past two
years.4 The court has consistently followed a restrictive policy in applying the subjective tests for patentability enunciated by the Supreme
Court, and has demonstrated a particularly wary approach toward
patents which are subjectively deemed to be merely "combinations of
old, known elements." Recently, however, the Ninth Circuit appears
to have veered away from the position taken in prior cases involving
"combination patents" and in the recent case of Reeves Instrument Corp.
v. Beckman Instruments, Inc.' upheld the validity of the patent on
the basis of objective tests which had been largely disregarded by the
court in the past. This decision may represent the vanguard for a
shift in policy by the Ninth Circuit towards a more liberal view regarding patents.
This note will briefly review the evolution of patent law in the
United States and the development of the various tests for determining
patentability which have been enunciated by the Supreme Court. Recent patent cases decided by the Ninth Circuit will be briefly reviewed
in order to provide the necessary backdrop for an analysis of the shift
in the approach of the court as illustrated by Reeves. The note will
conclude that the policy of the Ninth Circuit regarding patent validity remains largely unsettled, and the precedential value of Reeves, if any,
will be determined in subsequent cases brought before the court.
Development of the Concept of Patentability
The Constitution
The principle of granting a patent for inventions was quickly recognized by the delegates at the Constitutional Convention. 6 There
was little opposition by the delegates to the principle that patents
should be issued since many of the delegates were themselves inventors,
and it was widely felt that technological improvement incident to patentable ideas would benefit society while affording the inventor some
protection
Thus, the power to award patents was constitutionally
granted to Congress:"
4. Compare R. Dearborn & R. Boal, Adjudication by Circuits and Arts Involved, in Tm ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PATENT PRACTICE AND INVENTION MANAGEMENT 24
(R. Calvert ed. 1964) with cases cited in note 122 infra.
5. 444 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1971).
6. Garvey, History of United States Patents and Present Day Norm of
PatentableInventions, 5 MIAMI LQ. 541 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Garvey].
7. Id.
8. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. It should be noted that this clause incorporates both patents and copyrights.
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The Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the Progress of

. . . [the] useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to...
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective.

.

. Discoveries. 9

Immediately apparent is the fact that the constitutional provisions do
not contain any specific criteria for determining the type of "discovery" for which a patent should be issued. 10 Instead the broad language in the Constitution states only that patents are to be granted to
"inventors" for "discoveries."" The present day policy conflict has its
roots in this clause-Congress is to promote the useful arts by granting
exclusive rights to inventors.
Patent Laws
Congress, acting under the authority of art. 1, § 8, cl. 8, enacted
the first patent act in 179012 -"[an] act to promote the progress of useful arts." This act established the petitioning procedure for a patent13
and provided that a patent would be granted if
[the petitioner

has]

.

. .

invented

or

discovered

any

useful

art, manufacture, engine, machine or device, or any improvement
therein not before known or used .... 14
Subsequent to the Patent Act of 1790, there was dissatisfaction with
the rigidity15 of the "Patent Board" 16 in granting patents, which ultimately resulted in the enactment of the Patent Act of 1793.11 The
"Patent Board" was supplanted by a clerical function, and inventors
requesting a patent were merely required to file a petition with the secretary of state. The act empowered the secretary to issue patents
without examination. The Act of 1793 was thus obviously intended
9.
10.

Id.
Lutz, The Constitution v. The Supreme Court Re: Patents for Inventions, 13

U. PiTr. L. REV. 449 ,451-52 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Lutz].
11.

Id. at 451.

See Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability,

48 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 5 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Seidel]. "The standard for
... an invention would seem to be a political matter determinable from time to time
by the legislature, to obtain optimum social usefulness of the patent system."
12. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
13. Id. § 1, at 109-110.
14. Id. at 110.
15. Dissatisfaction resulted because the Patent Board could not devote enough
time to patent determination and because there was no appeal of the board's decision.
See generally Garvey, supra note 6, at 541; Federico, Commentary on the New Patent

Act preface to 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 to 110 (1954).

[hereinafter cited as Federico].

"While the Board . . . was quite favorable to the granting of patents .

.

. the other

duties of members of this Board . . . made it impossible for them to devote much time
to this work.

.

." ld. at 4.

16. A patent would only be issued if a board composed of the secretary of state,
the secretary of war and the attorney general, or any two of them deemed the
invention sufficiently useful and important. Id.
17. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318.
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by Congress to encourage inventors to exert their inventive genius in
order to promote technological progress. Since there were few, if any,
restrictions on patent issuance, no attempt was made in the act to
furnish any definition of patentability.
Following the Act of 1793, Congress enacted numerous amendments and revisions of the patent laws,18 and in the Patent Act of 1870,11
Congress revised and consolidated all the patent laws then effective in
the United States. 20 The Act of 1870, though amended numerous times
since its enactment,2 1 remained the law on patents until the Patent Act
of 1952. The Act of 187022 basically adhered to the negative rules
of the Act of 1790--"improvement not before known or used"--and
did not attempt any definition of patentability.
Before discussing the latest patent act-The Patent Act of 1952
-it may be appropriate to review certain landmark Supreme Court decisions regarding the interpretation of the term "patentability" under
the patent laws discussed thus far. As has been discussed, neither
the Constitution nor the patent laws attempted to specify or enumerate
any standards or criteria of patentability. At most, the statutes provided some negative rules for determining patentability.2" To fill the
void created by the lack of statutory policies as to patentability, the
courts evolved certain principles on a case by case basis. 24 The earliest cases reaching the courts involved patent infringement and the courts
generally applied a liberal standard25 in upholding the validity of the
patents-requiring only the statutory prerequisites of utility2 6 and novelty. 7 Of course, by limiting its review to a determination of whether
the item in question was new and useful, the courts had avoided the
issue of the degree of originality which was necessary to warrant the issuance of a patent.2 8 The Supreme Court first considered the degree of
18. See, e.g., Federico, supra note 15, at 4-5; Garvey, supra note 6, at 542-43.
19. Act of July 8, 1870, cl. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
20. Federico, supra note 15, at 5.
21. Id.
22. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 24 at 201, 16 Stat. 198.
23. See text accompanying notes 5 & 16 supra. See Seidel, supra note 11, at
9-17. Mr. Seidel addresses the question of whether the Constitution enunciates any
standard for patentable invention. He concludes there is no standard enunciated.
Id. at 16.

24. Seidel, supranote 11, at 37.
25. See, e.g., Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 242-44 (1832) (in effecting the purpose of the law, validity of patent depends on whether the machine was
known or used before the application for the patent); Pennock & Sellers v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1829) (patent grant is valid if the invention was
"not known or used by others").
26. Seidel, supra note 11, at 11.
27.

Id. at 31.

28. Id. at 30.

"It was not until about 1850 that the judges began to take a
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originality necessary for patent issuance in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood2 9
decided in 1850.
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood-The "Skilled Mechanic" Test
Hotchkiss is viewed as a landmark decision in patent law because
of the standard of patentability established by the Supreme Court
which went beyond the old test of novelty and utility as the prerequisites
for the issuance of a patent. The patent involved in Hotchkiss was a
porcelain door knob attached to a metal shank. The Court specifically
found that the concept of a doorknob was not new; nor was the metal
shank used in the design of the knob, nor the method of fastening
them together; each of the components of the alleged invention was
well known and in common use."
The only improvement over the
known prior art insofar as doorknobs was concerned was the use of
porcelain in making the knob, instead of other materials, such as
wood, which had been used in the past." The Court upheld the instruction of the lower court which had charged the jury3 2 that if they
found no more ingenuity or skill utilized in the particular device than
that of the ordinary skilled mechanic, the patent was void:
Now if the foregoing view of the improvement claimed in this
patent be correct, it is quite apparent that there was no error in
the submission of the questions presented at the trial to the jury;
for unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of
fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by
an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an
absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement
is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor. 33
The Court in Hotchkiss thus added a judicial requirement for patentability in addition to the statutory requirements of utility and noveltyan operative test requiring the device to evidence more than the skill
possessed by a mechanic experienced in the field in order to be patentable.34 The courts seized upon the so called "skilled mechanic" test to
implement a restrictive policy in the issuance of patents, and the interpretation of Hotchkiss has played a large part in the balancing of the
more active hand in shaping . . . the development of rules for determining the
presence or absence of invention.
...Lutz, supra note 10, at 453-54.
29. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
30. Id. at 264.
31. Id. at 265.
32. The issue of invention was considered a question of fact for the jury.
Seidel, supra note 11, at 34.
33. 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 266.
34. See generally 34 Ga-o. WASH. L. REV. 802 (1966).

April 19721

PATENT VALIDITY

1179

divergent policies of promoting technology versus the grant of a monop35
oly.
A policy shift toward a stricter standard of patentability paralleled the court's growing dislike of monopolistic powers. The restrictive market effects of cross-licensing, price fixing, and other modes of
market control often resulted in unlawful extensions of the patent
right.30 During this period, the term "patent monopoly" wed the patent
to prejudice, 37 especially when considered in the light of the public demand for Congress to deal with the powerful trusts of the country,
which finally resulted in the Sherman Act.38 Additionally, technological progress had been pushed to the point where advancement was
often considered the result of trial and error rather than discovery or invention, and the courts thus felt the grant of the patent monopoly was
no longer justified since most of the advances would be produced by
research efforts of industrial groups anyway.39
The increasing severity with which the courts viewed patentability4" culminated with the standards for patentability enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices
41
Corp.
Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices
Corp.-The "Flash of Genius" Test
In Cuno a suit for patent infringement was brought on a patent
for a wireless cigarette lighter of the type commonly found on the
dashboard of the present day automobile. The device for which the
patent had been issued provided a means for holding the lighter plug
in place until the heating coil was brought to the desired temperature.
The device incorporated an automatic thermostatic control for the
heating element with an automatic release that returned the plug to
35. Id. at 802-03.
36. See generally Arnold, The Abuse of Patents, 24 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 531
(1942). "We need a legislative provision which prevents the owner of a patent from
using it as an instrument of business policy to dominate industry and destroy independent enterprise." Id. at 543.
37. Rich, The Relation between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws,
24 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 85, 89 (1942). "Ask the average man whether monopoly is
bad and he will undoubtedly tell you it is." Id.
38. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209-10.
39. See generally Frank, Thoughts on Patents, 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 808,
812-14 (1942).
40. "However, from the late 1920's . . . the Supreme Court . . . [and] the
lower courts, applied an increasingly stricter standard of patentability or at least
applied the Hotchkiss standard with noticeably greater severity." Note, The Standard
of Patentability-Interpretationof Section 103 of the Patent Act, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
306, 307 (1963). [hereinafter cited as The Standardof Patentability].
41. 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
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the open-circuit position after the proper temperature was achieved.
The prior art included wireless removable automobile lighter plugs
and thermostatically controlled heating units. However, the lighter plug
in Cuno eliminated the necessity of having to continuously apply
pressure by hand in pushing the plug against the heating unit, and also
eliminated the requirement of constant attention to assure that there was
no overheating or burning out of the heating coil. The court found
that both the wireless lighter plug and thermostatically controlled
heating units were disclosed by the prior art, and held:
We may concede that the functions performed . . . were new and
useful. But that does not necessarily make the device patentable
...
. That is to say, the new device, however useful it may be,
must reveal42 the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of
the calling.
The conflicting policy views as to patentability were mentioned by Justice Douglas in the opinion, and he indicated a definite shift towards a reluctant attitude in tolerating the monopoly created by a patent,
by stating:
Strict application of [the "skilled mechanic"] test is necessary lest
in the constant demand for new appliances the heavy4 3 hand of
tribute be laid on each slight technological advance in art.
Cuno has been interpreted by most authorities as establishing a judicially evolved higher standard of patentability. 44 The immediate reaction of the lower courts to the Cuno decision was that the Supreme
Court had established a more restrictive standard for patentability. In
Picard v. United Aircraft Corp.4 5 Judge Learned Hand acknowledged
the new stricter trend:
We cannot, moreover, ignore the fact that the Supreme Court,
whose word is final, has for a decade or more shown an increasing disposition
to raise the standard of originality necessary for
46
a patent.
In the concurring opinion, Judge Frank specifically cited the ingenuity
test of Cuno. 47 Other courts, however, refused to find that the standard of patentable invention had been made more strict by Cuno. In
42.

Id. at 90-91.

43. Id. at 92.
44. See, e.g., Seidel, supra note 11 at 39; The Standard of Patentability, supra
note 40, at 308; 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 802, 803 (1966).
But see Nielsen, Flash
of Genius, 24 J.PAT. OFF. Soc'y 371 (1942).
45. 128 F.2d 632 (2d Cir. 1942).
46. Id. at 636.
Other cases supporting a new test include, Potts v. Coe,
145 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Anderson Co. v. Lion Products Co., 127 F.2d 454,
457 (1st Cir. 1942); Arcadia Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Princeton Knitting Mills, Inc.,
124 F.2d 330, 330-31 (2d Cir. 1941).
47. 128 F.2d at 639.
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Brown & Sharpe Manufacturing Co. v. Kar Engineering Co.48 the First
Circuit found evidence in the Cuno case that the "'flash of creative
genius' was not to be construed literally or applied generally." 49 Instead, the court noted language in Cuno that "establishes conclusively
that the Supreme Court has wrought no change in the classic test
["skilled mechanic"] for invention . . ... 50 Thus, whether Cuno
raised the standard of patentable invention was certainly unclear; however, it is interesting to note that subsequent Supreme Court decisions did
not apply the "flash of genius" test, even though adhering to a strict
standard of patentability.5 1
The vagueness surrounding the "flash of genius" test was shortly
compounded by the Supreme Court in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.5 2 Without specifically mentioning
the "flash of genius" test, the Court announced a new subjective standard for determining patentability.
A & P-The "Synergistic" Test
The patent in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (A & P) was on
a mechanically operated grocery counter that is today found in almost
every supermarket. The patent consisted of a counter extended from
the cash register and a movable frame upon which the merchandise
was to be deposited by the customer for movement to the clerk stationed at the register. The patentee did not allege he had discovered
the counter nor the movable rack, but noted that his patented combination of these known elements, satisfied a problem faced by all self-service stores. The Court reviewed the separate components of the alleged
"invention" and noted:
This counter does what a store counter always has done-it supports merchandise. . . . The three-sided rack will draw or push
goods put within it from one place to another-just what any
such rack would do . . . and the guide rails keep it from falling
or sliding off from the counter, as guide rails have ever done.53
The lower court had sustained the validity of the patent based on a detailed analysis of the prior artP5 -noting that the simplicity of the device was deceiving since numerous efforts utilizing these same elements
48.
49.
50.
Chicago
(7th Cir.
51.

154 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1946).
id. at 51.
Id. at 52; accord, e.g., In re Shortell, 142 F.2d 292, 295-96 (C.C.P.A. 1944);
Steel Foundry Co. v. Burnside Steel Foundry Co., 132 F.2d 812, 818-19
1943).
See 34 Gno. WASH. L. R.v. 802, 803 (1966).

52. 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
53. Id. at 152.
54. 179 F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1950), affg Bradley v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 78 F. Supp. 388 (E.D. Mich. 1948).
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to solve the bottleneck presented by the checkout counter in self-service stores had failed." The lower court concluded that the counter
represented a new and useful combination which met the requirements
for issuance of a patent."'
The Supreme Court was not persuaded by the numerous prior unsuccessful efforts at solving the problem, nor by the immediate commercial success of the counter combination. Rather, the Court chose
to consider each of the separate components individually, rather than
as a combination, and since each of the components was well known
in prior art, held:
This case is wanting in any unusual or surprising consequences
from the unification of the elements here concerned, and there
is nothing to indicate that the lower courts scrutinized the claims
in the light of this rather severe test . . . . [O]nly when the
whole in some way exceeds 5the
sum of its parts is the accumula7
tion of old devices patentable.
Thus, though the Court did not specifically mention the Cuno, "flash
of genius" test, the strict standard of Cuno was manifested in terms
of a synergistic test.
The portion of the A & P decision that evoked the most comment
from commentators in the patent field was the concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Douglas.5" Justice Douglas enunciated his view that patents
should be issued only in the exceptional cases:
Every patent is a grant of a privilege of exacting tolls from the
public. The Framers plainly did not want those monopolies
freely granted. The invention, to justify a patent, had to serve
the ends of science-to push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics and the like; to make a distinctive contribution to scientific
knowledge. That is why through the years the opinions of the
Court commonly have taken "inventive genius" as the test.55
Justice Douglas' "inventive genius" test would require a synergistic
result of two plus two equals five before a patent would be tolerated.
The Hotchkiss "skilled mechanic" test would not be sufficient since
this test would tolerate a patent when an increment of skill exceeding
that of an ordinary mechanic was displayed. 60 In effect, Justice Douglas appeared to follow the general strict tenor of his Cuno opinion,
thus raising doubts as to the viability of the "skilled mechanic" test of
Hotchkiss.6'
55.

Id. at 638-39.

56.
57.

Id. at 638; 78 F. Supp. at 392.
340 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added).

58.

59.
60.
61.
877, 882

The Standard of Patentability,supra note 40, at 309.

340 U.S. at 154.
See text accompanying note 33 supra.
See generally Gerhardt, Patent Policy and Invention, 34 J.
(1952).

PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
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A & P has generally been interpreted as establishing the strict view
that unless inventions are great "scientific advances," patents should
not be issued, 62 and the term "scientific advances" would appear to require a synergistic result as a prerequisite to patentability. The A & P
decision reflects the completed swing by the Court from its early benevolent attitude to a very restrictive interpretation of patentability.
In the case by case shifting of the standard of patentability toward the restrictive view espoused in A & P, the court evolved tests
became more subjective and vague. Thus, the patent procedure which
was originally envisioned as a vehicle to promote the useful arts was
detoured by a growing judicial disfavor for this grant of monopolistic
power. The growing inconsistencies in the application of these Court
developed tests prompted Congress to attempt to establish a more
objective test.
Because the statutory standards of patentability have generally
been terse and ambiguous, amplification of their meaning affords
considerable opportunity for judicial policy-making. In fact,
prior to 1952 the "law" applied in a particular case often seemed
to depend as much upon the judge's philosophy of the patent63 system as upon logical inference from an accepted legal standard.
Against this background, the next major step was taken in the evolving
concept of patentability-the Patent Act of 1952.4
Patent Act of 1952-The "Obviousness" Test
This act is the most recent congressional revision of the patent laws
and is considered by most commentators who are intimately involved
in the patent process, as reflecting a favorable congressional attitude
toward patents.6" The act contains a trio of sections66 (sections 101,
for patent102 and 103) which enumerate the statutory prerequisites
68
67
ability-a patent is to be issued if the device is useful, and novel
and non-obvious. 69 The major change in the evolving concept of patentability is the requirement of nonobviousness which was included
for the first time in a patent act. Section 103 of the act provides:
62. Brand, If No PatentLaws?, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'r 449, 451 (1952).
63. The Standard of Patentability,supra note 40, at 306-07.
64. Ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952), codified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1970).
65. See, e.g., Seidel, supra note 11, at 6; The Standard of Patentability, supra
note 40, at 312; Federico, supra note 15, at 22. "[Ilt is believed that some modification was intended in the direction of moderating the extreme degrees of strictness
exhibited by a number of judicial opinions . . . that is, that some change of attitude
more favorable to patents was hoped for." Id.
66. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1970).
67. Id. § 101.
68. Id. § 102.
69. Id. § 103.
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A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be pat-

ented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in
which the invention was made. 70
No previous statutory provision in the patent laws corresponds to this
requirement," even though the requirement might appear at first glance
to closely resemble the "skilled mechanic" test previously enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Hotchkiss. 2 With the requirement of nonobviousness, Congress appears to have desired a more even balance between the policy of promoting technology and the judicial disfavor
of patent monopolies evidenced in the court decisions. However, the
requirement of nonobviousness is itself an ambiguous term which fails
to establish a clear standard for patentability. Several commentators
who participated in the drafting of this act have commented on the
congressional intent behind the test of nonobviousness.
Mr. P.J. Federico, 73 who was one of the chief architects of the
Act of 1952, has stated that the intention of the drawers of section
103 was not to establish a radical departure in the previous level of
patentability, but rather to provide statutory recognition of the need for
moderation of the strict views which had been articulated in the cases
by the judiciary. 74 In Mr. Federico's view, the use of the term "obviousness" in the statute for determining patentability is primarily significant because of the great variety of subjective tests which were being utilized by the courts for determining patentability-for example,
"creative genius," "unusual and surprising"-which Congress could
have used in the wording of section 103.75 Congress by using the objective term "obviousness," apparently intended to adopt a moderating view to minimize the great departures by the courts following the
7
subjective tests.
Another commentator, Mr. L. James Harris,77 who was a major
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., The Standard of Patentability, supra note 40, at 309; Preface to
34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 545, 554 (1952).

72.

This was the view taken by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere

Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (quoted in text accompanying note 98 infra).

73.

Mr. Federico was the Examiner-in-Chief, U.S. Patent Office.

74. Federico, supra note 15, at 22.
75. Id. at 23.
76. "This section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures
which have appeared in some cases." H.R. REp. No. 1923, 82 Cong., 2d Sess., at
7 (1952).
77. Formerly Committee Counsel and Counsel to the Patent, Trademark and

April 19721

PATENT VALIDITY

1185

contributor to the final version of the act passed by Congress, also
acknowledges that the revision committee was primarily concerned with
the subjective nature of the tests utilized by the courts for determining
patentability: "The difficulty the Committee found in including a
provision on invention in the statute was in the subjective nature of the
concept. . . .,,r The framers of the act thus had attempted to express
this inherently subjective concept in as objective a term as possible. 9
Mr. Harris points to another indication of the congressional intent to
moderate the judiciary's subjective standards8 P-the addition of the statutory provision in the act giving a presumption of validity8 ' to issued
patents. Mr. Harris has stated his views as follows:
[T]he primary purpose of the revision was to modernize and
strengthen the patent laws, to give the patent right effectiveness
... . It was the intention of the drafters to enhance the dignity of the grant in the eyes of the judiciary .... 82
There is general agreement by the commentators who actively
participated in the writing of the Patent Act of 1952 that the act was
primarily intended to moderate the strictly subjective judicial standards
of patentability.83 Of course, these same commentators were also
quick to point out that the obviousness standard in section 103 did not
completely remove the subjective element in defining patentability.8 4 In
providing that a device must not be obvious to one of ordinary skill
in the field, section 103 also was subject to subjective evaluation. However, even though subjective analysis may be required to determine what
is "ordinary skill," and what would be "obvious" to a person with such
skill, the ultimate determination of "obviousness" was a standard on
which objective evidence could be adduced.8 5
There is a vast difference between basing a decision on exercise
of the inventive or creative faculty, or genius, ingenuity, patentable novelty, flashes, surprises and excitement, on the one hand,
and basing it on unobviousness to one of ordinary skill in the art
on the other.8 6
Copyright Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, the U.S. House of Representatives, Mr. Harris directed and supervised the actual work of the preliminary
drafts and final bill.
78. Harris, Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent of the Patent Act
of 1952, 23 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 658, 673 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Harris].
79. Id. at 675.
80. Id. at 680.
81. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1970).
82. Harris,supra note 78, at 698-99.
83. See Rich, The Vague Concept of "Invention" as Replaced by Section
103 of the 1952 PatentAct, 46 J. PAT. OFF.Soc'y 855, 865 (1964).
84. See, e.g., Rich, The Principles of Patentability, 42 J.PAT. OFF. Soc'y 75,
89 (1960).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 89-90.
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Immediately after the passage of the 1952 Patent Act, a few decisions by the courts of appeal indicated a willingness to adopt a moderation of the previous subjective standards. 87 However, any judicial
trend toward moderation was effectively terminated by the Supreme
Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.8 8
In Graham the Supreme Court, in holding the patent invalid,
for the first time interpreted section 103 of the new Patent Act.8 9 The
case involved a suit for infringement of a patent which had been
issued for a chisel plow. This particular plow utilized a spring-hinge
combination to absorb the shock and to push the shank of the plow
upward whenever the plow struck an obstruction.
The question of
patent infringement had been raised in two separate suits brought
in the Fifth9 1 and Eighth9 2 Circuits. The Fifth Circuit held the patent
was valid by applying its subjective test for patentability:
[A]n improvement combination is patentable even though its constituent elements are singly revealed by the prior art, where, as
here, it produces an old result in a cheaper and otherwise advan-

tageous way. ....
In a subsequent suit, the Eighth Circuit found the identical patent
invalid because "it did not bring about a significantly new or different
result."9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve
the conflict between the two circuits, both circuits having failed to
even mention section 103 in their opinion. Before discussing the
validity of the patent, the Court noted that the primary issue in the
case centered around the interpretation of section 103 of the Patent
Act of 1952. 9' In rebutting the contention by the patent holder
that section 103 had been intended by Congress to lower the standard
of invention required for a patent, the Court held:
.3

We believe that . . . [the] legislative history, as well as other

sources, shows that the revision was not intended by Congress to
change the general level of patentable invention.9 6
Of course, this statement of the Court could be interpreted at face
87.
88.

The Standard of Patentability,supra note 40, at 313.
383 U.S. 1 (1965).

89. Id. at 3.
90. The patent in Graham has been termed a marginal case, very likely to be
held invalid under low standards of invention. Harris, Section 103 Revisited, 9 IDEA
617, 628 (1965).

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Jeoffroy Mfg., Inc. v. Graham, 219 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1955).
John Deere Co. v. Graham, 333 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1964).
219 F.2d at 519.
333 F.2d at 534.
383 U.S. at 12-13.
Id. at 17 (footnote omitted).
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1187

value as97 allowing a continuation of the synergistic test enunciated in
A & P.
The Court continued:
We conclude that the section was intended merely as a codification of judicial precedents embracing the Hotchkiss condition,
with the congressional directions that inquiries into the obviousness of the subject matter sought to be patented are a prerequisite to patentability.
Although we conclude here that the inquiry . . . as to patentability must be beamed with greater intensity on the requirements of § 103, it bears repeating that we find no change in the
general strictness with which the overall test is to be applied. 8
The Court cited the prior A & P decision to re-emphasize the
fact that the ultimate question of patent validity was a question of law,
and then enumerated the criteria to be utilized in determining "obviousness" as follows:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art resolved. 99
Of course, these three criteria were merely a restatement of the
subjective criteria which had been utilized by the courts prior to the
enactment of section 103. For example, as has been previously discussed, the Court in A & P had held that the checkout counter patent
was invalid because it involved nothing more than a combination
of elements well known to the prior art. Had the court in Graham
stopped writing at the point where the three step analysis for determining "obviousness" under section 103 had been enunciated, there
would have been little question but that the Court did not view section
103 as a mandate to utilize more objective standards in determining
patent validity. However, the Court continued with the following
statement which has been the subject of continuing controversy among
the authorities in patent law.' 0
Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt
but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give
light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject
matter sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy. 1 1
97. The court acknowledged that section 103 abolished the test of Cuno---"flash
of creative genius." Id. at 15.
98. Id. at 17-19 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 17.
100. See, e.g., Dulin, Anderson's Black Rock Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co.:
A & P Revisited or A Blessing in Disguise? 4 JOHN MARsH. J. PnAc. & PROC. 28, 36
(1970); Editorial Note, After Black Rock: New Tests of Patentability-The Old Tests
of Invention, 39 GEO. WASH. L. RPv. 123, 142 (1970).
101. 383 U.S. at 17-18. "The focus of these inquiries is upon economic and
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The inclusion of the "secondary considerations" was the Court's first
pronouncement of objective criteria that could be utilized in determining patentability. The specific indices-"commercial success, long felt
but unsolved needs, failure of others"-had been held to be irrelevant
in the patentability analysis in Cuno and A & P. The recognition
of the "secondary considerations" as being a relevant part in the
patentability analysis indicated the awareness of the Court of the necessity for creating objective patentability criteria. Graham0 2 failed, however, to set forth the emphasis which should be given by the courts
to the "secondary considerations" in resolving the issue of obviousness.
The inherent ambiguity in Graham stems from the Court's reluctance
to be specific as to what point in the litigation, and under what circumstances, these "secondary considerations" were to be applied by
the courts. Thus, a situation was created in which courts desiring to
take a more liberal view toward patent validity were able to utilize
the "secondary consierations" to uphold patent validity in spite of the
Court's admonition that there was no change in the strictness with
which the courts were to view patents. 10 3 On the other hand, courts
predisposed to find the patent invalid could continue to apply the
subjective tests while referring to the high standard of patentability
required by Graham'0 4 and completely disregard the secondary considerations in determining obviousness.
For example, in Continental Can Co. v. Old Dominion Box Co."'
a patent for wrap-around paperboard cartons was found invalid. The
Court cited A & P as requiring a strict scrutiny of the patent and
found the secondary considerations unpersuasive: "Commercial success
and solution of a long-standing need in the art are secondary considerations which cannot breathe life into a patent otherwise invalid because
of obviousness."' 0 6 On the other hand, in Preuss v. General Electric
Co.' °7 a patent on an FM multiplex communication system was found
valid. The Court acknowledged that A & P required "the whole in
some way to exceed its parts" in the combination of known elements but that the commercial success and long-continued public acquimotivational rather than technical issues; the facts with which to resolve such
issues are more amenable to judicial treatment than are the technical facts with which
the courts generally struggle." Note, Subtests of "Nonobviousness": A Nontechnical
Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 1172 (1964).
102. 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 802, 807 (1966).
103. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
104. Comments, Obviousness in the Eighth Circuit, 14 ST. Loius U.L.J. 672,

679 (1970).
A review of courts in the Eighth Circuit indicate that a strict view
toward patents has been followed since Graham. Id. at 683.
105.

393 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1968).

106. Id. at 326.
107.

269 F. Supp. 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
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were important factors to be conescence in the validity of the patent
10 8
sidered in determining patentability.
The Supreme Court soon clarified its position regarding patentability in Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co. 0 9
Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement
Salvage Co.-A Return to A & P
In Black Rock, while acknowledging the obviousness test of Graham, Justice Douglas, who had previously authored the Cuno "flash of
genius" test, wrote the majority opinion and dispelled any doubts as to
the continuing vitality of the strict tests of patentability announced in
A & P.10 Black Rock involved a patent for a standard asphalt paving machine on which a radiant-heat burner was affixed to the side.
Asphalt paving is normally laid in strips, and difficulties had been
encountered in maintaining the required temperature of the asphalt to
250 to 290 degrees Fahrenheit in-order to assure a satisfactory bond
between the previously lain strip and the subsequent contiguous strip.
By attaching a heater to the paving machine, the asphalt was maintained at the desired temperature and this prevented a cold joint
from developing between the contiguously laid strips."' Justice Douglas noted that both the heater and the paving machine were known
to the prior art, and that the combination of these known elements in
the paver had contributed nothing new to the art which would warrant a patent-the combination of known elements failed to satisfy
the synergistic requirements established in A & P."-2 Justice Douglas
reiterated the need for a patent to push back the frontiers of knowledge:" 3 "'Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the
sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system
,"114

Justice Douglas reviewed the scope of the prior art, and noted
that the use of a radiant-heat burner in working asphalt had been patented in 1905. He then concluded that the mere attachment of this heater to the paver in the asserted patent did not advance the prior art-the
paver and burner combination did not produce a new function but
did what all pavers and burners would be expected to do. Using a
108. Id. at 996.
109. 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
110. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
111. The cold joint results in poor bonding between the two strips, creating
cracks, which allows water and dirt to infiltrate causing deterioration of the asphalt.
112. 396 U.S. at 61. "[O~nly when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of
its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable." 340 U.S. at 152.
113. See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
114. 396 U.S. at 61, quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1965).
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Graham type analysis, Justice Douglas concluded: "[T]he combination was reasonably obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art."' 15
In his analysis Justice Douglas completely discounted the significance
of the "secondary considerations"-the most objective criteria announced
by the court as indicia of obviousness in Graham. The court disregarded the commercial success of the paver-heater combination, the
long felt need for such a paver, the prior unsuccessful efforts to solve
the temperature problem, and the incredulity of experts in the field
when first approached with the idea of attaching the heater to the
paving machine.11 The only conclusion that can be drawn from the
Black Rock decision is that the Court, after viewing the finished product, utilized hindsight in reaching its conclusion that the device was
merely the work of a skilled mechanic, 117 and thus failed to meet
the strict standard of patentability established by the Supreme Court.
With the decision in Black Rock the Court clearly re-established, if
indeed there were any doubts, that a rigid judicial policy would be
followed toward patents, and that the patent monopoly was to be
granted only in exigent circumstances.
The lead of the Supreme Court was quickly followed in the lower
courts. In Woodstream Corp. v. Herter's, Inc.118 a patent for an animal trap was held invalid despite its proven commercial success and
utility. The Humane Society had also awarded the inventor an award
"because of the humane features of the trap;""' 9 however, the district
judge concluded: "I see no 'flash of creative genius' reflected in...
[the] animal trap . . .,120
"
and also expressed his general views regarding patent validity as follows: "The courtrooms . . . do not afford
a congenial forum to the holder of a United States patent."'12' This
statement by the district court judge is in accord with the opinion of
Justice Douglas in Black Rock in that it enunciates the strict policy
view of granting a patent monopoly only in exigent circumstances and
indicates that certain of the lower courts will continue to apply a
restrictive standard of patentability.
115.

Id. at 60.

116. See id. at 59. "While the Fourth Circuit was persuaded by nontechnical
evidence, the Supreme Court treated such 'secondary considerations' as irrelevant."
Editorial Note, After Black Rock: New Tests of Patentability-The Old Tests of
Invention, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 123, 147 (1970).
117. The Supreme Court had early recognized the trap of hindsight as typified by
this comment: "Now that it has succeeded, it may seem very plain to anyone that
he could have done it as well. This is often the case with inventions of the greatest
merit." Webster Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 591 (1881).
118. 312 F. Supp. 369 (D. Minn. 1970), rev'd, 446 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971).

119.
120.

Id. at 371.
Id. at 373.

121.

Id. at 370.
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Patent Validity in the Ninth Circuit
Ninth Circuit decisions since Black Rock indicate that the rigid
view of Justice Douglas toward patents has been generally followed.
There have been nineteen decisions handed down dealing with patent
validity, and of these, only two have held the patent valid. 122 The
court generally cites the nonobvious requirements of section 103 in
holding the patent invalid. However, it is readily apparent from a review of the decisions that the court places an undue reliance on the
decision of the Supreme Court in A & P-a device which is merely
a combination of old known elements, lacking the synergistic result
does not warrant the granting of a patent monopoly.
The Traditional Approach Since Black Rock
In Ashcroft v. Paper Mate Manufacturing Co. 12 3 a suit for patent infringement was brought by the holder of the patent for "piggy
back" pen refill units. The patented device utilized connector elements between the two cartridges which provided the rigidity necessary for projection and retraction while still allowing the cartridges
to be interchanged when one refill ran out of ink. Vents in each cartridge allowed the ink to flow to the writing tip. At the outset of the
opinion, the court indicated its general attitude towards patents:
The history of the American patent system is replete with the
122. Cases involving patent validity which have been decided since October 1969
in the Ninth Circuit are as follows: Exer-Genie, Inc. v. McDonald, 453 F.2d 132
(9th Cir. 1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-1042, 49 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Feb. 22,
1972) (invalid); Regimbal v. Scymansky, 444 F.2d 333 (9th Cir. 1971) (invalid);
Reeves Instrument Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 444 F.2d 263 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3220 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971) (valid); Bates Industries,
Inc. v. Daytona Sports Co., 441 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W.
3279 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1971) (invalid); Stockton Wire Products, Inc. v. K-Lath Corp.,
440 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1971) (invalid); Ceramic Tilers Supply, Inc. v. Tile Council
of America, Inc., 439 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1971) (valid); Silvey v. Nielsen Corp.,
437 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1971) (invalid); Volvo, Inc. v. Cummings & Sander, Inc.,
435 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1971) (invalid); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 444 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1970) (invalid); Ashcroft v. Paper Mate Mfg.
Co., 434 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1970) (invalid); Helena Rubinstein, Inc. v. Bau,
433 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1970) (invalid); Ethicon, Inc. v. Handgards, Inc., 432 F.2d
438 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 929 (1971), reh. denied, 403 U.S. 912
(1971) (invalid); Bada Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 426 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 916 (1970) (invalid); United Tanks, Inc. v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 425 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1970) (invalid); Geo. J. Meyer Mfg. Co. v. San Marino
Electronic Corp., 422 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1970) (invalid); Stevenson v. Diebold, Inc.,
422 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832 (1970) (invalid); Hamlow
v. Scientific Glass Apparatus Corp., 421 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1970) (invalid); Spring
Crest Co. v. American Beanti Pleat, Inc., 421 F.2d 950 (9th Cir. 1970) (invalid);
Caborundum Co. v. Wilbanks, Inc., 420 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1969) (invalid).
123. 434 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1970).
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continuing tension between a strong public policy against monopoly and a desire to encourage inventions which will benefit the
public. This tension has been resolved by
1 24the courts setting a high
and exacting standard for patent validity.
The patentee claimed that the prior art failed to reveal a tight fit
between the tandem cartridges, but the significance of the connector
element and vents in this patent which allowed a tight fit between the
tandem instruments was summarily discounted by the court. 1 2 The
court noted that it had in a prior case' 2 6 summarized the principles
of A & P-only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum is a
combination of known elements patentable-and then emphasized that
1 27
adherence to these teachings of the Supreme Court was required.
The court concluded that the patent was merely an improvement
over several other patented tandem writing instruments and stated:
"Both elements are within a pen barrel and they 'are simply shoved
one inside the other.' ",128 The fact that this device utilized a connector
in a new way which was a crucial improvement over the prior art was
summarily discounted by the court.
In Regimbal v. Scymansky 29 a patent for a hop-picking machine
was held invalid even though the court had specifically found that the
machine was both novel and useful. 130 The court held that the patent failed to satisfy the "unusual or surprising" test of A & P. 3'
The
court further explained that strict standards are applied to determine
patentability because "the courts have been sensitive to the fact that
issuance of a patent . . . [may] grant a monopoly for seventeen years

on ideas . . . that were previously a part of the public domain."'13 2 In
Regimbal, the court held that in an assessment of the patentability of
combination patents, a special standard must be incorporated. Quoting Judge Duniway, 33 the court found the special standard to be derived from A & P:
In assessing the patentability of combination patents, we are to
apply a 'severe test,' whether 'the whole in some way exceeds the
sum of its parts' to produce 'unusual or surprising consequences'
from the unification of the elements .... 134
124.
125.
126.
(9th Cir.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 912.
Id. at 914.
Jeddeloh Bros. Sweed Mills, Inc. v. Coe Mfg. Co., 375 F.2d 85, 87-88
1967).
434 F.2d at 912.
Id. at 914.
444 F.2d 333 (9th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 336.
Id. at 340.
Id.
Bentley v. Sunset House District Corp., 359 F.2d 140, 144 (9th Cir. 1966).
444 F.2d at 339.
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Even though the court has specifically expressed this rigid policy
towards patent monopolies in only three cases, 135 the high percentage
of cases in which patents are found invalid creates a reasonable inference that the Ninth Circuit is following the Supreme Court's policy
lead-the monopolistic aspects of a patent represent a detriment to
society which overrides any possible benefit which might be derived
by society in terms of promoting technology. 3 6
In many of the patent infringement cases in the Ninth Circuit, the
court initially characterizies the patented device as a so-called "combination patent"--a combination of old known elements in the prior
art-which immediately brands the patent as suspect.' 37 The court
relies a great deal on the following language from A & P:
Courts should scrutinize combination patent claims with a care
of finding invenproportioned to the difficulty and improbability
38
tion in an assembly of old elements.'
The courts' initial finding that the patent merely involves a combination of old elements, known in the prior art, largely preordains the
ultimate finding by the court of patent invalidity. If the language of
A & P regarding the "difficulty and improbability" of finding patentability in a combination of known elements is taken literally, there will
be few, if indeed any, devices which can stand the test. In other words,
the fact that the device may represent the first time these particular
elements were combined to achieve a desired result is deemed unimportant; and unless the combination yields a synergistic result, the court
will refuse to uphold the patent. The fact that the "synergistic" test
is applied by the court subjectively, after the combination has taken
place, has been criticized by the commentators. 3 9 Further, if the device is reduced to its lowest components-ball bearings, screws, etc.135. Regimbal v. Scymansky, 444 F.2d 333 (9th Cir. 1971); Ashcroft v. Paper
Mate Mfg. Co., 434 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1970); Spring Crest Co. v. American
Beauti Pleat, Inc., 420 F.2d 950, 952 (9th Cir. 1969) ("This demonstration of
simple mechanical skill does not warrant monopolistic protection.").
136. See Michel, Was the U.S. Patent System Planned for Supermen? A Comparison with Copyright Protection, 32 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'" 375, 377 (1950). "At the
present time, the majority of the bench apparently are convinced that patents are
bad for the common welfare. .... "
137. "We are enjoined to scrutinize such patents (combination) 'with a care proportioned to the difficulty and improbability of finding invention in an assembly of
old elements'." Bada Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 426 F.2d 8, 10 (9th Cir. 1970);
"I[Tis court has recognized that 'the concept of invention is inherently elusive when
applied to a combination of old elements' . . . ." Stevenson v. Diebold, Inc., 422
F.2d 1228, 1229 (9th Cir. 1970).
138. 340 U.S. at 152.
139. "Courts . . . unlike scientists and engineers working at the bench, would
expect more than the small increments of improvement that make up progress in
the useful arts." Harris, supra note 90; at 626. See text accompanying note 117
supra.
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the "synergistic" test will preclude the patentability of any device.
The Ninth Circuit has traditionally applied the A & P rationale in patent infringement suits, and as previously discussed, has ruled the patent invalid in 90 percent of the cases brought before it.
In Volvo, Inc. v. Cummings & Sanders, Inc.'40 the suit for patent infringement involved a patent which utilized a new device for fastening shoulder and lap safety belts in automobiles. There were several other types of shoulder and lap belts in the field; however, this
particular belt was the only one which provided a common point of
intersection for the shoulder and lap elements, and allowed the
belts to be fastened at the same time-other belts in the field required
independent fastening of the shoulder belt and the lap belt. The
court found that both the fastener and the type of belt utilized in the
patent were known in the prior art, and the patent was held invalid because it failed to "satisfy the stringent rule for patentability for de141
vices that aggregate elements known to the prior art."
As previously discussed,1 42 the Supreme Court early recognized
that possible errors could be occasioned if the courts followed hindsight
analysis for determining patent validity. Thus, the Court in Graham
had suggested certain "secondary considerations"' 43 as useful indicia for determining patentability. These secondary considerationscommercial success, long felt need, prior unsuccessful attempts to solve
the problem, etc.-are particularly pertinent for the so-called "combination patent" because they offer objective criteria for the court's
analysis. 4 ' Of course, Justice Douglas in Black Rock relegated the
"secondary considerations" to truly secondary status: "It is . . . fervently argued that the combination filled a long felt want and has
enjoyed commercial success." But those matters "'will not make patentability.' 11'
Any viability that Graham may have given to the "secondary considerations" as objective indicia of patentability were thus
eroded by the Black Rock decision. The Ninth Circuit has generally
followed the lead of Justice Douglas in relegating the "secondary considerations" to truly secondary status insofar as patentability is concerned.
In Bada Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co.14 6 the patent had been
140.
141.

435 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 982, citing Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip.

Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
142.
143.

144.
145.

See note 139 supra.
See text accompanying note 101 supra.
34 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 802, 806 (1966).
396 U.S. at 61, quoting Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket

Equip. Co., 340 U.S. 147, 153 (1950).
146. 426 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1970).

The Court does not mention Graham.
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issued by the Patent Office for a device which used a four step method
of balancing automobile tires. The court found the patented device
simple and easy to apply, and also noted that it was undisputed that
the patented device solved what had been a continuing problem 4in7
the industry and that it had enjoyed significant commercial success.'
However, the court stated: "To be sure, the combination here filled
a long-felt need and enjoyed commercial success. But that is not
enough to show patentability."' 14
In Carborundum Co. v. Wilbanks, Inc., 4 9 the patentee had discovered that a "hard ceramic" suction box would reduce wire wear
in the Fourdrinier papermaking process. The high cost of wire replacement and lost production caused by shutdowns to replace the wire
were "accepted as one of the realities of using the Fourdrinier process,1' 15 and most paper producers used this particular process in their
plants. The court, in finding the patent invalid, minimized the significance of "secondary considerations" in its analysis: "[E]vidence that
the device was commercially successful and met a long felt but unneed was correctly categorized as 'secondary' under John Deere
solved ",151
In summary, the Ninth Circuit's traditional approach in patent in-

fringement suits has been to slavishly follow the dicta in A & P of regarding "combination patents" with suspicion, and to relegate the objective "secondary considerations" to secondary status.' 52
A judicial policy of granting a patent monopoly only in exigent
circumstances, the need for a stringent analysis of combination patents, and a reluctance to consider the "secondary considerations" as
indicia of patentability is constantly expressed or implied in the Ninth
Circuit decisions. The court, however, appears to have either relaxed
or reversed certain of its traditional approaches in the recent case of
Reeves Instrument Corp. v. Beckman Instruments Inc.153
147. Id. at 10.
148. Id.
149. 420 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1969).
150. Id. at 46.
151. Id. at 50-51.
152. One commentator suggests that giving these considerations secondary status
occurs when the judge uses subjective hindsight in determining patentability. Gausewitz, Brief in Support of Proposed Amendment to Section 103, Title 35, Patents,
U.S. Code, 51 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 290, 323 (1969). Other decisions in the Ninth
Circuit treat secondary considerations negatively. See, e.g., Schwinn Bicycle Co. v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 444 F.2d 295, 300 (9th Cir. 1971) (issuance of
licenses to competitors to use patent and commercial success rejected); Stevenson v.
Diebold, Inc., 422 F.2d 1228, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 1970) (testimony of an expert that
he would have doubted that the patent would work and commercial success rejected).
153. 444 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3220 (Nov. 9,
1971).
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Reeves Instrument Corp. v. Beckman Instruments,
nc.-A New Approach
The patent in Reeves was for a device which utilized a static
and a dynamic operational check of analog computers. The patent
was composed of a combination of older elements-amplifiers, potentiometers, switches, and other common electronic parts-which had
been extensively used throughout the computer field. The Reeves
patent had the advantage of checking the voltage at the input to the
integrating circuit which prior check methods had lacked. However, the patent contained no claim of new components, and rather
consisted merely of a new combination of prior known elements.
The court, after a somewhat lengthy technical discussion of the
operational nature of the patented checking device, turned its attention
to the issue of patentability. The court referred briefly to the criteria
enunciated in the Patent Act of 1952-new, useful, and nonobviousand summarily concluded that the device was both new and useful.
Next, the court met the contention that because the device was merely
composed of old known elements, it lacked patentability under the
standard of A & P:
This argument fails on two grounds. First, it misconstrues
the import of the A & P decision. Second, it suggests an analytical approach to patentability which is directly contrary to the
statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 103 which provides that the inquiry into patentability must be drawn toward the "subject
matter as a whole" and not to the elements of a claimed combination and their individual novelty.
.. . Carried to its logical conclusion, the argument here
would result in a rule to the effect that A & P precludes the
patenting of virtually every new mechanical or electrical device
since the vast majority, if not all, involve the construction of
some
54
new device (or machine or combination) from old elements.'
Of course, the criticisms' 55 which have been leveled at the rigidity of the courts in applying subjective after the fact analysis to "combinations of known elements" closely approximate the above language
of the court. With hardly a change of pace, the court acknowledged its
prior reliance on A & P,156 and Black Rock,' 5 7 and blandly noted:
[P]rior art methods of accomplishing the claimed static check
failed to check at the input to the integrator. The
claims in issue
58
here all require checking at the integrator input.1
In other words, the court shifted its emphasis from the composition of
the "combination patent," and instead relied on the result achieved by
154. Id. at 270.

155.
156.
157.
158.

See text accompanying notes 63 &75-86 supra.
444 F.2d at 271.
Id.
Id.
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the new combination. This shift in emphasis is all important, and represents a significant departure from the prior cases' 59 in which the
court had held that though the new device attained a desired result,
the device represented merely a "combination of known elements" and
thus lacked patentability.
In another significant swing away from its prior decisions, the
Ninth Circuit in Reeves for the first time in a patent infringement suit
placed emphasis on the "secondary considerations." The court acknowledged the difficulty in evaluating the level of skill involved in
any patent:
In this respect, the Supreme Court has noted that 'such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved
needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the
circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought
to be patented. 10
The complexity of the problem involved in developing a suitable computer checking device, the fact that the Air Force had chosen the
Reeves patent for a computer facility which was larger than any previously built, and the fact that fifteen different approaches had been
previously attempted to solve the problem-including research at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology-were deemed persuasive by
the court as indicia of patentability' 6' and the patent was therefore
held to be valid.'" 2
To briefly summarize then, the court in Reeves appears to have
done a complete about face regarding the emphasis to be accorded
the composition of the "combination patent," and instead relied for the
first time on the results obtained by the new combination in determining
patentability. Further, the court's reliance on "secondary considerations" in its analysis of patentability represents a significant departure
from prior decisions in the Ninth Circuit.
159. "When hoary devices like spring and cams are involved, it will be a rare
case indeed when mere artful placement of them will be non-obvious." Bada Co.
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 426 F.2d 8, 11 (9th Cir. 1970) (emphasis added); "In
no field has the doctrine of 'strictness' been so manifest as that of combinations of
old (known) elements." Gausewitz, supra note 152, at 304. See text accompanying notes 135-37 supra.
160. 444 F.2d at 271-72.
161. "Substantial efforts by others in the art which fail to accomplish the result
achieved by the patented invention are persuasive indications of non-obviousness."
Id. at 272. See also 34 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 802, 807 (1966). The subtests of
Graham would be of particular value where elements are known.
162. The only other Ninth Circuit decision finding a patent valid was in
Ceramic Tilers Supply Inc. v. Tile Council of America, Inc., 439 F.2d 1124 (9th
Cir. 1971), where the court affirmed the district court's finding of patent validity.
The case was remanded twice before a final decision was reached and offers little
guidance on patentability in the Ninth Circuit.
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Whether the court in Reeves was attempting to establish a more
liberal policy regarding patent validity-favoring the promotion of
technology in spite of the monopolistic aspects of patents-may be a
short lived inquiry. In a more recent case, Exer-Genie, Inc. v. McDonald'6 3 the Ninth Circuit may have regressed to its prior strict interpretations of patentability. The patent involved an exercising device which operated on a friction-resistance principle. The patentee
acknowledged that the idea for the exercise device had been derived
from an old patented fire escape device which had been in general use
for about 85 years. The court pointed out that upholding the validity
of the patent in this case would provide a patent monopoly without any
corresponding social benefit, and thus concluded that "the old device
put to a new use is not again patentable merely because the new use
was unanticipated."' 6
The court noted that both the function and
structure of the old patented fire escape devices were the same as in the
litigated patent, and were therefore within the realm of public knowledge for which a patent should not be issued. 16 5 The language used
by the court does not, however, indicate that the invalidity of the patent
was based on the fact that it was composed of known elements, an
analysis which was generally followed by the Ninth Circuit prior
to Reeves. Instead, the court stated that a combination of old elements producing a new result may be patentable: "While a new combination of old elements may be patentable if it produces unexpected
results, plaintiff's exerciser is not a new combination, but an old and
well known one."1 66 The court disregarded "secondary considerations" in its analysis-the alleged patent's commercial success; the long
felt but unfulfilled need for portable exercise equipment; and the fact
that the device had been copied by others, as persuasive indicators of
patentability. However, the fact that the court found that the structure
1 67
and function of the device was already disclosed in prior patents,
indicates that the court would not necessarily have been required to
consider these "secondary considerations" in this case: "It is well settled
that mere application of an old device to a new use does not constitute
[patentable] invention."' 6 However, the court appears to have qualified this language by stating that under certain circumstances a new use
for an old device might still be patented:
163. 453 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1971), appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S.
Feb. 22, 1972).
164. Id. at 134.

165.

Id.; see Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57,

61 (1969), where the Court stated: "Moreover, Congress may not authorize the
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public
domain. ...."
166. 453 F.2d at 135.
167. Id. at 134.
168. Id. at 133.
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This [referring to the above quotation] and similar statements
quoted throughout this opinion are subject to the caveat that a
new use of ar old machine may be patented as a process. What
is not patentable is the old machine itself. .

.

. Thus, a "process"

may be patented (35 U.S.C. § 101), and "process" is defined to
include 1"a
new use of a known . . . machine" (35 U.S.C. §
100(b)). 6 9
Whether the decision in Exer-Genie implies a regression to the Ninth
Circuit's prior strict interpretation of patentability may be open to
question; 170 however, it would appear significant that the alleged patent
may not have provided the necessary question of patentability that
would require a Reeves type analysis-a combination of old known elements to form a new device that produced a new result. In Exer-Genie
there was no combination of elements, but merely a new use of an old
device.
Summary
The concept of patentability has trod a path strewn with many
tests since the first Patent Act in 1790. These tests, both statutory
and judicially evolved, have generally been developed against a background of conflicting policies-the promotion of technology versus the
granting of a monpoly. The desire to promote technology appears to
have had the most persusaive force in Congress and the judiciary during the early history of the country. This intent was expressed in
the Patent Act of 1790-all that was required was that the invention
be new and useful for patentability. Subsequent Patent Acts have
also continued to require these two elements. Against this background,
a series of judicially evolved tests for patentability were evolved.
The basic problem with the judicial tests was their inherently subjective quality which often allowed a judge to apply his own policy views
on the issue of patentability. The significance of this judicial freedom
was that the courts, beginning with Hotchkiss in 1850, indicated that
the monopolistic characteristics of patents was an evil which should
only rarely be allowed to flourish, and this policy judgment was given
a persuasive position in the courts' analysis. This judicial policy represented a change from the earlier more liberal policy; however, the
change is not surprising since it closely parallels the rising tide of
public discontent with the abuses of monpolistic business practices.
In any event, the courts gradually evolved and applied what are generally
considered as more restrictive tests of patentability.
169. Id. at 133 n.1 (emphasis supplied).
170. Judge Ely, in dissent, would have found the patent valid based on the
presumption of patent validity and the "secondary considerations of commercial
success and the copying of the patented device by competitors." Id. at 136-37.
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The increasing severity with which the courts viewed patentability culminated in the "flash of genius" test enunciated in Cuno. Under
this decision a creation required special ingenuity-a flash of geniusbefore it was patentable. Many courts and commentators viewed
Cuno as a mandate from the Supreme Court to apply a higher standard for patentability. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court in A & P
announced the synergistic test for patentability-the device, as a unit,
must do more than the sum of its parts. The policy view of the Court
was expressed by Justice Douglas when he noted that the patent was
a monopoly, and monopolies were not to be freely granted unless a synergistic result is obtained-two plus two equalling five. This case by
case shift toward a restrictive view of patentability was also accompanied by an increasing subjectivity on the part of the courts in the
tests which were applied. Inconsistencies in the decisions of the various courts which used these subjective standards were inevitable, and
created a desire to establish a more objective standard, and were
generally considered to be the motivating force behind Congress' enactment of the Patent Act of 1952.
The Patent Act of 1952 incorporated the first additional statutory requirement for patentability since the Patent Act of 1790nonobviousness. The nonobviousness test, which appears to closely resemble the "skilled mechanic" test in Hotchkiss, is generally considered as an expression by Congress to strike a more even balance between the restrictive and liberal patent policy views. Most commentators viewed the act as an expression for a more adequate and objective view toward patents. Subsequent Supreme Court cases indicated
that the judiciary view toward patentability was not to be moderated
by this act. The first case to interpret the nonobviousness test of the
Patent Act of 1952 was Graham. The Court specifically stated
that the act was only a codification of judicial precent (Hotchkiss and
A & P) and that prior tests of patentability were to be strictly applied. While outlining the procedures to be applied under section
103, the Graham Court introduced the first objective criteria that
could be utilized in determining patentability-secondary considerations
such as commercial success, long felt need, etc. The significance of
these "secondary considerations" was never clarified by the Graham
decision, though it is generally agreed that their application would provide needed objectivity to a court's analysis of patentability.
Any doubts as to whether the Court had adopted a more liberal
standard of patentability were dispelled in Black Rock. The Court
applied the synergistic tests of A & P and minimized the significance
of the secondary considerations in finding the patent invalid. The
monopoly created by the patent was considered to outweigh the original constitutional desire to promote technology.
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Recent Ninth Circuit decisions indicate that the restrictive view
toward patents expressed in Black Rock has been followed. The Ninth
Circuit has consistently expressed or implied that the granting of a
patent monopoly was to be tolerated only in exigent circumstances. Accordingly, the court continued to apply the subjective tests enunciated
in Cuno, A & P, or Black Rock and refused to consider any of the
secondary considerations of Graham in determining patentability.
The court's consistent application of a restrictive view on patents
was abandonedin Reeves. The Reeves decision indicates that the Ninth
Circuit has, at least temporarily, swung away from its prior strict view
regarding patents. Whether this is a beginning of a trend remains to
be answered by subsequent decisions. If Reeves is not the beginning
of a trend towards a more objective evaluation of patentability, Justice Jackson's warning will continue to haunt the patentee: "[T]he
only patent that is valid is one which the court has not been able to get
'171
its hands on."
John R. Lacy*
171. Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949)
dissenting).
* Member, Second Year Class
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